Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Disclaimer: I am not an expert on Aristotle’s ethics, so there may be inaccuracies and omissions below. I would appreciate any corrections or additions.

Note: Need to revise this page to take into account also information from Wikipedia’s page on Aristotelian ethics.

Introduction

The Nicomachean Ethics is Aristotle’s most influential work on ethics, exploring the nature of the good life and how humans can achieve flourishing (eudaimonia). Central to his philosophy is the cultivation of virtues—character traits that enable individuals to live rationally and well.

Virtue as a Disposition: For Aristotle, a virtue is not just a habit or a feeling, but a stable disposition (hexis) to act and feel in the right way, formed through repeated practice and guided by reason.

Aristotle’s Virtues

Aristotle distinguishes between moral virtues (traits of character) and intellectual virtues (traits of mind). Both are essential for achieving eudaimonia.

Moral Virtues

Moral virtues are habits that help us find the mean between extremes in our actions and emotions.

Core Virtues of Character

• Courage (andreia): The mean between recklessness and cowardice.

• Temperance (sōphrosynē): Moderation in pleasures; between self-indulgence and insensibility.

• Generosity / Liberality (eleutheriotēs): The mean in giving; between prodigality (wastefulness) and meanness (stinginess).

• Magnificence (megaloprepeia): Appropriate spending on large-scale projects; between vulgarity and pettiness.

• Magnanimity (megalopsychia): Greatness of soul; the mean between vanity and undue humility (pusillanimity). This virtue concerns the proper estimation of one’s own worth, especially in relation to great honors. Magnanimous people are those who think themselves worthy of great things and are truly worthy of them.

• Proper Ambition: The mean between excessive ambition (philotimia, overreaching for honor) and lack of ambition (aphilotimia, undue humility or lack of concern for honor).

  • Note: Aristotle says that the virtuous mean here does not have a name. The term “proper ambition” is a modern interpretive label.
  • Note: While some writers conflate it with magnanimity, Aristotle treats proper ambition as a separate virtue that concerns the desire for honor in ordinary matters, whereas magnanimity is about greatness in relation to the highest honors. It is about having the right attitude toward honor in general, not just the highest honors.

Virtues of Social Conduct

• Good Temper / Mildness / Patience (praotēs): The mean regarding anger; between irascibility (excessive anger) and apathy (deficiency). Having the right amount of anger, expressed at the right time, toward the right people, and for the right reasons.

• Truthfulness (alētheia): The mean between boastfulness and self-deprecation.

• Wittiness (eutrapelia): The mean in conversation; between buffoonery and boorishness. Note: Some scholars classify this as “social graces” or “minor virtues” because they deal with manners and social interaction.

• Friendliness / Affability: The mean in social conduct; between being quarrelsome and being ingratiating. This virtue concerns being pleasant and appropriate in everyday interactions. Confusingly, Aristotle uses the term philia both in the sense of the virtue of friendliness and in the sense of deep friendship.

  • Note: The virtue of friendliness refers to appropriate social conduct with acquaintances and strangers, while philia as friendship refers to deeper, reciprocal relationships. See the section on Friendship below.
  • Note: Some scholars have classified it as a “social grace” or “minor virtue” as it deals with manners and social interaction (rather than deep moral character or justice).

Virtues of Justice and Equity

• Justice (dikaiosynē): Giving each their due; the mean in relation to fairness and lawfulness, especially in distributing goods and rectifying wrongs. Aristotle distinguishes between distributive justice (fair distribution of goods) and corrective justice (rectifying wrongs in transactions). Justice is unique among the virtues in that it always concerns our relations with others and the community as a whole.

  • Note: In addition to being a particular virtue, Aristotle also describes justice as the “complete virtue” in relation to others, encompassing all moral virtue as it applies to social life.

• Equity / Fairness (epieikeia): The virtue of correcting the rigidity of strict legal justice — interpreting the law fairly in cases where strict application would be unjust. Note: While some scholars treat equity as a distinct virtue, Aristotle himself describes epieikeia as a “higher form” or “completion” of justice, not a separate virtue. It is the truest or best form of justice, especially when the law is too general to fit particular cases.

Intellectual Virtues

Intellectual virtues are qualities that enable us to reason well and seek truth. Aristotle distinguishes between virtues of the practical intellect (concerned with action and deliberation) and the theoretical intellect (concerned with contemplation and understanding fundamental truths):

The Main Virtues

• Art or Technical Skill (techne): The ability to make or produce things well.
• Scientific Knowledge (episteme): Systematic knowledge of facts and causes.
• Intuitive Reason (nous): The capacity to grasp first principles.
• Theoretical Wisdom (sophia): The highest form of knowledge, combining intuitive reason (nous) and scientific knowledge (episteme), directed at understanding the most fundamental and eternal truths and principles.
• Practical Wisdom (phronēsis): The ability to deliberate well about what is good and beneficial for oneself and others.

Note: Aristotle holds that practical wisdom (phronesis) is especially central and necessary for all moral virtue. One cannot be truly virtuous without the ability to deliberate well about what is good and act accordingly. Thus, practical wisdom is essential for applying the doctrine of the mean in real-life situations. This is the intellectual virtue most closely tied to moral virtues.

Auxiliary Virtues

Aristotle mentions subsidiary/supportive virtues that are closely related to practical wisdom (phronēsis) but not on the same level:

• Understanding (synesis): Good sense or sound judgment; the ability to judge well in particular situations, especially regarding the actions and advice of others.
• Good Deliberation (euboulia): The ability to deliberate well about what is achievable.
• Judgment (gnome): The capacity to make sound decisions in particular cases.

Minor Graces of Character

Aristotle sometimes discusses minor graces of character or traits that are praiseworthy but do not rise to the level of full virtues. These are often described as “graces” (charites) or “quasi-virtues”. They are typically associated with social conduct, manners, or the finer points of character.

Minor graces can be grouped into two main categories:

Social Graces

These are traits primarily concerned with manners, social interaction, and the way one presents oneself in society. They are often praised for making social life pleasant and harmonious.

• Dignity (semnotēs): Seriousness or dignity in bearing oneself, especially in situations that call for respect. Appropriate self-respect.

Note: Some scholars classify the following as social graces, though Aristotle treats them as full virtues (so they were already mentioned above): Wittiness (eutrapelia), Friendliness (euphrosynē), and Truthfulness (alētheia).

Quasi-Virtues

These are traits that are praiseworthy and restrain us from vice, but which Aristotle does not consider full virtues — often because they are more like feelings or responses than stable character traits.

• Goodwill (eunoia): Wishing good to others without expecting anything in return; a benevolent attitude. Sometimes discussed as a quasi-virtue in the context of friendship.
• Modesty / Shame / Sense of honor (aidōs), the mean regarding shame; between shamelessness and excessive shyness. It is discussed as a feeling that restrains us from disgraceful actions. It is praiseworthy, especially in the young, but not considered a full virtue for adults (because virtue is a state of character, not a feeling), though some scholars consider it a quasi-virtue.
• Righteous Indignation (nemesis): The mean between envy and spitefulness; feeling pain at undeserved good fortune.

The Golden Mean

Aristotle’s doctrine of the golden mean teaches that virtue lies between two extremes (excess and deficiency). For example, courage is the mean between recklessness and cowardice. Importantly, the mean is “relative to us” — it is not a strict mathematical middle, but is determined by reason as the prudent person (phronimos) would determine it, taking into account the individual and the circumstances. The right action depends on the situation and requires practical wisdom (phronesis).

Aristotle’s Method and the Role of the Phronimos:

Aristotle does not provide a simple formula for finding the mean. Instead, he says that the mean is what the phronimos — the practically wise or prudent person — would determine in each situation. The phronimos serves as a model or standard for moral judgment, showing by example how to balance reason, emotion, and circumstance in virtuous action.

Note: Not all actions or emotions admit of a mean. Some (such as murder, adultery, theft, or envy) are always wrong, regardless of circumstances.

The Eudemian Ethics

In addition to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote another major ethical treatise known as the Eudemian Ethics. While less well known today, the Eudemian Ethics was likely the standard text on Aristotelian ethics for several centuries after Aristotle’s time. Some scholars believe the Eudemian Ethics predates the Nicomachean Ethics. There is also a third, less influential work, the Magna Moralia, sometimes attributed to Aristotle, which summarizes similar themes.

Some passages in the Eudemian Ethics are identical to those in the Nicomachean Ethics, but there are also notable differences:

For example, the Eudemian Ethics discusses several virtues and graces of character:

• Dignity: A minor grace of character, associated with appropriate self-respect.
• Kalokagathia: The beautiful and good nobility of a gentleman — a concept unique to the Eudemian Ethics and not named as such in the Nicomachean Ethics.

For more, see the Wikipedia page on the Eudemian Ethics.

Other Key Topics in the Nicomachean Ethics

The Function Argument

Aristotle argues that the good for humans is to fulfill their unique function (ergon) as rational beings. Human flourishing (eudaimonia) consists in living a life in accordance with reason and virtue.

Akrasia (Weakness of Will)

Aristotle explores why people sometimes act against their better judgment, a phenomenon he calls akrasia (Greek for “lack of self-control” or “weakness of will”).

Aristotle makes several important distinctions related to akrasia:

1. Akrasia vs. Akrateia:

   • Akrasia: Refers broadly to weakness of will or incontinence: failure of self-control; acting against one’s better judgment, whether due to pleasure, anger, or other passions.
   • Akrateia: Translated by some scholars as “licentiousness” or “self-indulgence”. It is the lack of moral restraint, habitual lack of self control and inability to restrain one’s impulses or appetites, particularly in matters of pleasure, especially in sexual indulgence; promiscuity or lawless indulgence in sensual pleasures. More broadly, it can refer to disregard for accepted rules or standards, especially in behavior or morals.

   Akrasia is the broader category, while Akrateia can be seen as a type or subset of akrasia, often referring to a more entrenched, habitual, or extreme lack of self-mastery, especially in the context of sensual pleasures. However, in some contexts, both terms are used almost interchangeably. Both terms are often translated as “incontinence” in English.

2. Incontinence (akrasia) vs. Continence (enkrateia):

   • Incontinence: A person fails to act on their rational decision due to overpowering desires.
   • Continence: A person manages to act rightly despite contrary desires. Importantly, enkrateia (continence) is not full virtue, but rather self-control in the face of temptation.

3. Types of Akrasia by Cause:

   • Akrasia can be caused by pleasure (e.g., overindulgence) or by anger.

4. Forms of Akrasia by Process:

   • Impetuosity: Acting without prior deliberation, swept away by emotion or appetite.

   • Weakness: Failing to act on one’s rational decision after deliberation, due to overpowering desire.

     Both are forms of akrasia, but differ in whether the person deliberates before failing to act rightly.

Friendship

Aristotle sees friendship as essential to the good life. He distinguishes between three types of friendship:

• Friendship of utility: Based on mutual usefulness or advantage.
• Friendship of pleasure: Based on the enjoyment one gets from the other’s company.
• Friendship of virtue: The highest form, based on mutual respect and admiration for each other’s character and virtue, where each wishes the good for the other for their own sake.

The Role of Pleasure

Aristotle discusses the place of pleasure in the good life, arguing that the best pleasures accompany virtuous activity. He rejects the idea that pleasure is the highest good, but sees it as a natural part of human flourishing.

Pleasure and Activity: Aristotle argues that the highest and most appropriate pleasures are those that perfect and complete our activities, especially the activities of virtue. Thus, pleasure is not opposed to virtue, but is its natural accompaniment when we act well.

The Highest Good and the Contemplative Life

Aristotle identifies eudaimonia as the highest good for humans. He argues that the life of contemplation (theōria) — the exercise of theoretical wisdom — is the highest and most complete form of happiness, though moral and practical virtues remain essential. Aristotle debates whether the contemplative life or the practical (active) life is superior, ultimately favoring contemplation but recognizing the value of moral virtue and political engagement.

(This is similar to the famous quote “The unexamined life is not worth living”, though it was said by Socrates, not Aristotle.)

The Role of Habit

Aristotle emphasizes that virtues are acquired by habit (ethos), not by nature or by teaching alone. Repeated practice of virtuous actions forms virtuous character.

Justice: Universal and Particular

Aristotle distinguishes between universal justice (virtue in relation to others, encompassing all moral virtue as it applies to social life) and particular justice (fairness in distribution and rectification of wrongs).

Influence

The Nicomachean Ethics has had a profound influence on Western philosophy, shaping ethical thought from antiquity through the medieval period and into the modern era. While Aristotle’s ethical works were known in antiquity, their influence in Western Europe waned during the early Christian period. They became central again in the Middle Ages, especially after being reintroduced to the Latin West through Islamic and Jewish philosophers such as Averroes and Maimonides. Later, they became foundational for Christian thinkers like Thomas Aquinas.

The Nicomachean Ethics remains central to contemporary discussions of virtue ethics, which draw heavily on Aristotle’s emphasis on character, practical wisdom, and the cultivation of virtues as the basis for moral life.

Conclusion

For Aristotle, living well means cultivating both moral and intellectual virtues, guided by reason. By developing these virtues, individuals achieve eudaimonia — a life of fulfillment, purpose, and true happiness.